

The Economic Club of New York

87<sup>th</sup> Meeting

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Dr. Fridtjof Nansen

Professor James T. Shotwell

Mr. Philip W. Wilson

Rear Admiral Thomas P. Magruder

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Introduction

Nathan L. Miller, President

Ladies and gentlemen, we are fortunate tonight in many respects. The subject for discussion happens to be a peculiarly timely one on this very night. I shall not trespass upon the time of the speakers. We are fortunate in having men who, whether the views which they may present agree or not will, at least, be able to present the subject from different viewpoints.

But you are to have an especial privilege and pleasure in hearing from a distinguished visitor who has signally honored us by his presence here tonight and who will speak before the stated subject for discussion is taken up.

A great deed, a signal achievement, often becomes permanently associated with a man's name, what other great deeds he may subsequently perform. Thirty-six years ago the distinguished guest of honor started out with the Fram(?) to prove a then novel theory propounded by him, and to make an Arctic exploration of scientific purposes. He proved his theory and he reached the farthest point to the North of any explorer up to that time, and despite his distinguished services to mankind since I think he is still known as an explorer and his name is linked with that of a great countryman of his who also, as an explorer, won imperishable fame and whose tragic fate the world still mourns, Mr. Amundsen.

Dr. Nansen is to undertake another exploration next year, and he will speak on the subject of that undertaking next Wednesday evening at the Town Hall under the auspices of the Civic Forum. He will undertake that expedition under conditions which will mark the great progress that has been made in the world in the last thirty-six years. But I ought not to introduce him to you tonight as an explorer because of his signal work for the cause of mankind in so many different fields. In the advancement of science; as the high Commissioner of the League of Nations in the relief of distress; as a diplomat and a statesman in maintaining the cause of weaker nations, and in promoting the peace of the world. Great explorer, scientist, diplomat, statesman, and above all great humanitarian. I have the very great pleasure and I esteem it a very high privilege to be able to present to you the guest of honor, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen. (Applause).

First Speaker

Dr. Fridtjof Nansen

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen; I esteem it a very great honor indeed to be asked to address you tonight and to address such a distinguished audience. I understand that the subject of the evening is armament, and I may perhaps be expected to say a little which is related to that subject. But I am afraid that I would have little to tell you about the work for disarmament which would be new to you and to such a distinguished audience. But I expect perhaps it might be of some interest if I tell you a little about the experiences I have had during the eight years of my work to relieve the effects of war.

I am sure there are many here present tonight who, much better than I, can give you a picture of the horrors of the battlefield and of the horrors of war. But perhaps there might be few present who have had the same experiences in other directions connected with war, I mean the consequences of war, the after-math of war. I have now spent nearly eight years with millions of prisoners of war and refugees, and famine stricken people, and I have had ample opportunity to study what a war really means, not while it is going on, but after it has been finished.

It is now more than ten years since that horrible catastrophe ended. But the world, especially on my side of the ocean, is still suffering from the wounds of that war, which are far from being healed. But when that war was ended there was scattered more than a million prisoners of war over Russia, Siberia, and also in several countries in Europe, prisoners of war who could not get home to their own country because the Governments to whom they belonged did not have the means to bring them home, did not have Governments strong enough to be able to negotiate with other Governments in order to come to an agreement as to how the prisoners were to come home; governments that had no economic means to do the transporting, and had no means to arrange for transportation and locomotion, and the consequence was that more than a year after the war had been ended they were still there, without anything having been done to bring them home. The Governments had tried, but tried in vain, to come to an agreement to bring back the prisoners of war.

Then in the Spring of 1920, about a year and a half after the war had been ended, was held the first meeting of the Council of the league of Nations, and at that meeting somebody proposed or, rather, mentioned the prisoners of war and said that that might be a task for the League of Nations to try to solve the problem of the repatriation of the prisoners of war. That was unanimously adopted by the Council and agreed that they must find a man to take charge of that work. I don't know why it should have happened, but I suddenly got a telegram from the Council asking me whether I would be willing to take that task, take charge and the responsibility of trying to repatriate the prisoners of war, and after refusal on my side, at last it ended with me taking over that work, as I was assured it would only last a few months; I could just work out the program from it, propose it to the League of Nations, what it would cost, and the League would see to it that it was carried out, and inexperienced as I was in international affairs, I took the job and I am still at it. (Laughter)

Well, what were the conditions? There were at that time something like one million prisoners scattered all over Siberia and Russia, in camps, and some of them after the Armistice had been signed, tried on foot to reach their homes, but most of them never were heard of, disappearing on the way. The Governments had, as I said, tried to come to an agreement between each other how they could be brought home, but nothing came out of it. The Red Cross had tried, the international Red Cross, and also other branches of the Red Cross in the various countries, had tried, and with little success. It was necessary first of all to make the Governments willing to cooperate to bring those prisoners home, and being the high Commissioner of the League of

Nations I had a great advantage of being able to speak to every nation, every government, in the name of the League, and that made all the difference, because all the governments at once then said, “Yes, of course we are willing to cooperate and do our very best to come to an agreement with you about the repatriation.”

The first thing to be done was, however, to come to an agreement with the soviet government in Russia, and I went straight to Moscow; telegraphed to Tohicherin, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or rather the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and said, “I want to see you,” and I got an answer that I was welcome. I came at once to Moscow. I met Tohicherin and began to discuss with him. He was very kind and very nice. But he said, “Whom do you represent?” I said, “I represent the League of Nations.” Well, he said, “I am very sorry, but then I cannot speak with you because we don’t recognize the League of Nations.” Then I said, “Well, have you asked me to come here to tell me that in Moscow? Why couldn’t you telegraph that to Norway and you would have spared me this journey” Will you see that I get a train back tomorrow morning?” Well, he said, “You are not in such a hurry.” “Yes, I am. Time is very precious. I must go back and try to arrange it some other way.” Wee, he said, “Can’t we talk a little?” I said, “I have come here to talk but you tell me that you won’t talk to me, and that I cannot talk.” (Laughter)

Well, he said, “but wouldn’t you like to see Moscow?” and so on. I said, “Yes, sight-seeing is very nice, but not just now. I haven’t got the time.” He said, “Can’t you telegraph to the various Governments and represent them?” I said, “I am representing the various Governments.” He

said, "Have you any papers?" "No, I haven't brought them." "Can you telegraph to them?" "Well," I said, "give me a piece of paper." I wrote down, "May I represent you to come to an agreement with the Russian Government about the prisoners of war?" And I handed it to him and I said, "Send that to any Government you like." And he said, "Oh, we don't have to wait for an answer. We can start discussing at once." And in that way began the discussion and in a very few hours we had come to an agreement that the Russian Government was to bring the prisoners of war to the Russian frontier and I had to bring the Russian prisoners of way from Germany and from Austria and Hungary to the Russian frontier, and there we had to exchange prisoners, and they went back in the same trains that brought the others. Well, they greed, and then the next step was to find the money for it, but that was even more difficult, because the League had no money. I had to find the money myself. There was some money for reparation purposes given, a loan given by various Governments, and that money was not used yet, and there was sufficient remaining, I thought then, to start repatriation with, and I asked the various Governments whether they were willing to give such a loan to those countries that had to bring their prisoners home, and that was arranged, and then we started to work.

Well, I cannot detain you very long, but the work was very difficult. You know the prisoners were in miserable condition. They were far away. Many of them had not heard from their homes for all the time they had been prisoners in Siberia. There were, as I said, nearly a million of them. Some of them had been prisoners for five or six years, and before we ended even seven years, being carried from one prison camp to the other, concentration camps, and some of them very

badly treated indeed. I know, for instance, one case of such a prison camp in Turkestan, where they got cholera, and the population there got very frightened, and the camp was surrounded with barbed wire, and outside the barbed wire were placed machine guns and nobody was allowed to leave the camp, and there they had to remain, these prisoners, until everyone was gone. Fancy what that meant for these people, seeing the others die one after the other, and knowing that they were not allowed to get away. Such things happened, and worse than that, even. I won't try to describe all the horrors of it, but it gives you a little idea of what prisoners of war may suffer under such circumstances.

Many of them had started on foot to walk all that long distance from Central Siberia to the frontier, and get back. As I told you before most of them never reached the frontier, and disappeared on the way. But now they were brought to the frontier, and the worse part of it was there were the diseases and especially spotted typhus. You know what that means. There is hardly much hope when you get spotted typhus if you are as old as forty years. There is no hope almost then, and when you get between thirty and forty, there may be 30 percent hope to get through, and when you are younger, perhaps a little more. Fortunately, that disease is only caused by lice, and it cannot be transmitted from one person to another without lice, and therefore disinfection is the one thing. But I knew perfectly well that if we brought a single case into Europe that they would stop their frontiers, and the repatriation of prisoners would stop, and therefore every prisoner had to go to a disinfecting station. All clothes were taken. They went in their in the bath, were washed carefully, all clothing was carefully disinfected, and they also got

new clothing to some extent, especially thanks to the Swedish Red Cross that gave them underwear and everything, and we were fortunate enough to repatriate about half a million prisoners without a single case of typhus coming across the frontier. (Applause)

To cut a long story short, I may tell you that we succeeded in being able, although that was in May, 1920, when we started work, we were able to report at the first meeting of the league of Nations, the first assembly in Geneva in November the same year, that the greater part, or nearly all of the prisoners of war, had already been repatriated.

But of course there were some left. We had, for instance, at that time a fleet going in the Baltic Sea of fourteen big steamships bringing prisoners backward and forwards, and I think it is perhaps a record, as far as economy goes, and that may be something of interest to this Economic Club, to tell you that we repatriated nearly 450,000 prisoners at the cost of 400,000 pounds Sterling. That means less than a pound apiece.

Well, but then we had left 10,000 prisoners of war in Vladivostok. That was the most difficult thing. They had gone East instead of West, and to bring them back from Vladivostok was very expensive, so expensive that I could not afford it with the little money I had, because it would cost approximately 30 pounds Sterling per head, and I did not know what to do. But then the Americans came in and said, "Well, we are willing to help you out. We are willing to pay the transportation of these prisoners of war from Vladivostok to their homes in Europe." It was the

American Red Cross, the Jewish Association, and various other associations that got together and did that, and thanks to the Americans we were able to even repatriate those, and in that way all the prisoners of war were actually repatriated. (Applause)

Perhaps to tell you an example of the many difficulties there are, I may tell you that there were one thousand Turkish prisoners of war in Vladivostok, and for them I got no money, and I could not transport them with the money I had because Turkey was not in the league, and the American money was not sufficient, because it was for those others. Consequently there was nothing. But the Turkish Government agreed to pay for them, and they notified me that they had handed over 45,000 pounds to the British Government in order to get those prisoners home and I telegraphed to the British Government and said, “Kindly let me have that money in order to get them back.” The British Government said, “We are very sorry but we have handed the money over to the Japanese Government.” I telegraphed to the Japanese Government and said, “Will you kindly let me have that money to bring them back?” And the Japanese Government answered, “We are very sorry but we have already hired a Japanese ship to bring them back,” and as the money was not sufficient they had paid the rest, and it would cost 55,000 pounds and I telegraphed and said, “While I have to express our deep gratitude for your generosity, I regret that you did not do it with us because we could have done it a little cheaper.” (Laughter)

Anyhow the Japanese ship took the prisoners in Vladivostok and brought them around through the Suez Canal, and brought them up through the Mediterranean, and they came as far as

Dardanelles. There they could see their homes, the Turkish land, and they were rejoicing, looking forward to coming back to their own, when they met a Greek man-of-war, and were taken prisoners again. (Laughter) By that time, as you well know -- this was in 1921 00 at that time the Greeks and the Turks were at war, and these prisoners were brought to Greece and kept on board that ship in a most miserable condition again, of course, and I telegraphed to the Greek Government and protested against taking these prisoners, because they were going to a neutral harbor, Constantinople. Constantinople was at that time, as you remember, occupied by yourself and the other Allied powers, and consequently it was a neutral harbor. The Greek Government said they were very sorry, but they could not respect that, they would have to keep them. Then I telegraphed back to the Greek Government, "At any rate I won't discuss that with you, I don't agree with you but I cannot do anything, but I can demand at once the release of the old men and the women, and the sick ones." And that was done. But still there were six hundred prisoners left. After a while I asked them "Well, won't you allow me to bring these prisoners to shore and make a camp for them?" I could do that in Ital, I thought, and that the Greek Government agreed to, and then we made a camp for them there, and after a few months I came to an agreement with the Greek Government that they would allow these prisoners to go home on condition that they promised not to go into the Turkish Army again. But anyhow, that shows what difficulties we had. There were many such cases.

That was one of the things we had to do after the war. It took a very long time, but it was the result of that war. The experiences were hard, but still they were nothing compared with the

famine which followed in Russia. That was also to some extent the result of the war. It was immediately the result of a very bad drought in Russia but, of course, it was the war that had gone over that country. The Armies had gone backwards and forwards, and all their supplies had been taken away, and when the famine came there was nothing to resist the consequences, and you know a little about that in this country, because America, under Hoover's leadership, did a wonderful thing. The relief work of the Americans in Europe during and after the war is, of course, unique in the history of the world, as far as humanitarian work goes, and it had its climax in Russia when they fed ten million people and saved them from death in that part of the world, which was the most fertile part of Europe, and we on our side did what we could in order to fight that off. But I wish I could give you a picture of what that famine meant when you came into houses where they were lying on the floor, not moving. They had spent their last energy in their last desperate attempt to collect a little grass or leaves to try and eat it as bread. It was their last hope, and they had laid down to die, not moving, only waiting for help, if it could come from somewhere, or death as soon as possible in order to end their sufferings, and I don't like to go further into the description to indicate what happened when they took out corpses from the church-yard to eat them as food, and mothers killed their own children to eat them, or all the rest of the horrors, even such worse than that. That is what war really means when it comes to reality, and that famine, anybody who saw that, of course, will never forget, especially those miserable children.

I remember, for instance, one morning I came into a children's home. Forty children had died during the night, and when I came in there they were lying dead in their beds. Along with living children, and they were gazing at you with those big eyes staring as if were into death itself.

At last that was past. But on top of that came the catastrophe in Greece, when the Greeks were driven out of Asia Minor by the Turks, and we saw on the road three or four hundred thousand people at the same time, simply going ahead, going ahead as fast as they could, for fear that the Turks would come and massacre them, and then they poured into Greece, a million and a half prisoners, into a Nation that only had four and a half million before, and they had to absorb and assimilate that one and a half million. You know what happened. At last we succeeded in raising a loan for Greece in order to settle those refugees, and it is due to the admirable work that was carried out by the Commission of the League, headed by Americans, first Morgenthau, then came Hood, and then still under the leadership of Americans, and that has been a great success and is now actually the beginning of a new era for Greece. When all these new prisoners that came from Asia Minor, with new courage and new initiative, have begun to cultivate vacant land in Greece, and it really means a great improvement for the future of that country.

On top of that came the tragedy of the Armenians, when the Armenians were wiped out, deported by the Turks into the Arabian desert, and it was decided to try to wipe out the whole race, and statistics show that before the war there were in Turkey about 1,800,000 Armenians. After the deportation had taken place there were only 800,000 left. That means that more than

one million people had been wiped out, methodically, by the Turkish Government and their authorities, and that is perhaps the worst tragedy that we have had in our days, in our history, and that tragedy is not solved. We are now trying to send the Armenian refugees that still survive back to the present Republic in Russia, in order to try to establish for them a national home, and to develop that home as well as we possibly can. The plan is to irrigate the desert there, which is very fertile as soon as it is irrigated, and to settle the people on that land.

I could tell you much more about the miseries that follow are and are the result of war. In my opinion the war ought to have taught the world what war really is. But it seems that many people have already to some extent forgotten what it was. At least I cannot explain in any other way when I hear people light-heartedly speak of the next war as an inevitable event to come in the future. What does the next war mean? Well, I think everybody who has studied this war and its effects will realize that the next war will mean nothing less than the destruction, the end of white civilization , and that the next war will not be to the benefit of any nation in the world but will be to the ruin of them all.

Now at this time you may think it is perhaps better, but I am certain that no nation will avoid the consequences of the war if it ever comes. To speak about the next war as if it was something that we knew what it would be -- none of us knows what the next war will be. We speak about Armies and Navies. But again none of us can say with certainty that Armies and Navies will be of much importance in the next war. I very much doubt it. I have a feeling that perhaps the

battlefield will be the safest place to be in during the next war, because it will be in the open air, and gas will drift away, while the cities will all be exposed to attack from dangerous gases; indeed, when thousands and thousands of people may be wiped out in a few minutes by poisonous gases, and all experts will tell you that they haven't yet got any means of defending themselves against those gases. To me it seems that there is no question in the whole existence now which is more important than to work for permanent peace for the world, to avoid what is called the next war. (Applause)

After having seen what the results of war are, I think it is quite natural that I am becoming a fanatic, a champion for peace, and for the work for peace. (Applause) And I say there is no question that can be compared with it. We politicians work for new reforms and for improvements and for social improvements. But what does it all come to when the next war comes and wipes out the whole thing and creates a new existence of misery, all kind of difficulties for future generations, and they will have to cope with new problems of quite a different kind, and all that we now work for will be nothing compared with it.

The last war has taught us that war is more and more becoming a war between peoples and less and less between Armies and Navies. That was the last war, but you may be certain the next war will chiefly be a fight of industries, people against people, and, as I say, I don't think the Army and Navy will be of very great importance after all. That is my view of it, according to what I have seen in Europe. I admit, of course, that it may be entirely different here. You have an

entirely different position, and in that way it may be quite different in America. But I am only speaking of conditions in Europe, and that is why I say it is the one thing to be worked for by men who have any influence in their own country, and in their politics, to work for peace. Therefore, I think one of the most important steps that have been taken lately is what has been generally called the Kellogg pact. It is all right. Some people say it is not of much importance. But I say that the fact that that Pact has been signed is sufficient for me to say that the world is really going in the right direction. After all it is not so very important where we are as in what direction we are moving, and the fact that that happened seems to me to indicate that we are, in spite of all that is said, moving to some extents, at least, in the right direction. I think the important thing is not so much disarmament, physical disarmament, as disarmament of the mind. (Applause)

It is important to teach young people to grow up with a new idealism, a new history of the world, where war is not the one chief thing, but where there are also other things quite as important. I remember my own history was chiefly a book about wars and battles, and war heroes, and that was the one thing to be admired, the men of the battlefield who fought for their country and fought for liberty and for the freedom of their people. Of course, when it is necessary it is a great thing. But there are other things in the world that can be admired quite as much as that, that are not fighters, but that are the champions and workers for peace and peaceful cooperation between people, between governments, between nations, and between the various parts of the world, and that is the Gospel in my opinion of the future, and that is to teach and to educate the young

people to understand that the one thing of importance is to work for you Nation, but by working for your Nation you work for humanity and you work for the progress of the world, and not for destruction, and not for war which does nothing but destroy and can never bring anything but destruction, and to work for something that brings new ideals and new future to humanity.

(Applause)

PRESIDENT MILLER: Speeches such as we have just heard seem to me to be the best means so far discovered of promoting a disposition of the world for peace. The whole world ought to be compelled to hear every once in a while related the experiences that Dr. Nansen has just related so graphically to us.

We are compelled to make a change in the program owing to the illness of Senator King. I will read his letter just received today:

“I am greatly distressed because I am unable to keep my appointment to speak before the Economic Club tomorrow evening. Two weeks ago I became ill with a severe case of the flu and have been kept at home until today. I was in bed for ten or eleven days. Today I ventured out and came to my office for a short time, this I did against the advice of the doctor. The flu has left me weak and debilitated, and in such physical condition as to make it unwise for me to attempt to come to New York tomorrow. I hope that you and your associates will forgive me for my failure to be with you tomorrow evening. I felt complimented in being asked to address your

organization and look forward with pleasure to the opportunity of meeting you and those who will be present upon the occasion referred to.”

Gentlemen, we have now reached the state subject for discussion of the evening, and as I told you, whether different views are presented or not, the speakers will, at least, speak from different points of view. The university professor is often required to work for the satisfaction of doing work worthwhile, without being accorded always the public recognition that others sometime receive. However, the next speaker, professor of one of our great universities, Columbia, has already attained a reputation of his work in connection with international affairs, with foreign relationships. He has attained a reputation for scholarship and for soundness of judgment, but lately he has published an important work on the subject of “War as an instrument of National Policy.” I take great pleasure in introducing to you as the first speaker on the subject for discussion for the evening Professor James T. Shotwell of Columbia. (Applause)

Second Speaker

Professor James T. Shotwell

Mr. president and gentlemen; I come to the discussion tonight of the question of the reality of the Pact of Paris, and of its pertinence to the adjustment of American-foreign policies, not as a pacifist, although I have been accused of being a pacifist -- I hereby disclaim it -- I come to the subject rather as a student of history who has been dislocated from his academic work, in fact

who is an academic war casualty. For, from another angle, I have been kept at the task of observing the effects of the World War which Dr. Nansen has been examining from the standpoint of the human cost, and it is the experiences which I have had during the last ten years in the study of the displacement that the war has caused in the normal processes of civilization which lead me to the conclusions that I am about to give you tonight.

Dr. Nansen has sketched for you, and only sketched, the human cost of the World War. It happens to have been my task as director of the division of economics and history of the Carnegie Endowment, research division of that organization, to have been examining the economic and social displacement of war. To attempt to describe, if not to measure, for it is impossible to measure accurately in terms of science, what the war meant to the process that was up-building civilization in the various nations in the close of the Nineteenth and opening of the Twentieth Centuries. In this survey, which has now extended over practically all the countries that were belligerent and neutral in Europe as well, certain general results already stand out. Let me say first of all that one result is not yet obtainable, in spite even, and here I speak with becoming deference, in spite even of some official figures from the Government, the actual economic costs of the war are not yet obtainable. One must measure them not simply in terms of set budgets or of definite expenditures, but against that the almost incalculable curve of probabilities in the world that was carrying on its business with increasing prosperity. Nevertheless, although the statistical data of the war are as yet unobtainable, we do know, we have been able to come to certain very clear, definite points of view, and we have been able as

well to start to outline and describe for the coming centuries, because at the instigation of Mr. Root this record was put on imperishable paper, the way in which the civilized world mobilized its energies and directed them in the great industry of destruction, and I may say, and it is particularly pertinent here, that your past president, Mr. Hines, has the volume on the direction and control of American railways when they became a problem of national control, and that that is part of the story of mobilization which robbed the industrial and financial world of the freedom of peace time competition, and in the very nature of war itself took over into a vast tyranny and directed for its own final aims, the energies of civilization.

It was not mere chance that threw, for instance, even this element of railroad control into the hands of the government, for it is already possible to establish scientifically, by a comparative study of the different countries faced with similar crises, that the reactions and the remedies were almost identical in every case and, strangely enough, the form of war government of the United States, without having studied, I imagine, in detail, because details have been impossible to find, without having studied in detail the organization of other war governments, followed and worked out for itself the truest form of war government and mobilization of industry that we have seen.

It was from examining these elements that I was led to a strange conclusion, strange in terms of history. As an historian examining the relative importance of the events of our own time I became convinced that the greatest thing that was taking place in our time, the greatest historical event was not the disaster of war, nor even this strange almost miraculous mobilization of a world that had become accustomed to peace. The greatest event was the undertaking in the post-

war years of the coordination of civilization without the stress of crises to guide it; without the stimulus of catastrophe in front of it; to build up the intangible structure of international peace. There is nothing like it in the world before. There is no parallel effort of our day of its kind. Individual enthusiasm of men was just as strong in any past time. But the coordinating activities of men in the up-building of those structures which are the insurance against recurring war has no parallel in history, and as I look over that great effort which centered at Geneva and at The Hague, and then finally where the United States, at this moment orienting itself, somewhat puzzled, somewhat unsecure in what it is doing in the direction of this great energy that builds constructively against disaster, I am prepared to maintain that not only is this sound policy but that it is, furthermore, inevitable policy.

Sooner or later these forces of common sense, of decent relationship between the great civilized peoples, are bound to work out the prevention of the disaster which no civilized nation wants. There is no doubt about the reality of the desire. But is the Kellogg pact, or the Pact of Paris, because the words are those of M. Briand, although the negotiation was that of Kellogg -- the Briand-Kellogg Pact let us call it -- is it substantial, is it real, or is it only another expression of the general will to peace? Is it an ideal, or a rhetorical or moral gesture?

It is my conviction that it is much more real than the country has yet discovered; that the contract which has been made, for now it is made, because there will be no difficulty with any other ratification, is a binding contract of the most serious kind, and that it being of that nature calls for

the careful considerate action of the American people with reference to the policies that should be coordinated with it.

There are only two clauses, to be sure. They are very general. They were not meant by M. Briand to be the final text of the treaty. There was a good deal of misunderstanding about that. M. Briand simply sketched two great clauses to be built upon, but they were left in their original form. The first states that war as an instrument of national policy is renounced and the second is that the settlement of disputes of any kind whatever between nations shall never be sought except by pacific means. It does not say that they must be settled at all. They may be left unsettled. But if settled they must be settled by pacific means. When you analyze this you will find in the first place that the thing that is renounced has never yet been defined. We do not renounce war. We renounce only one kind of war, war as an instrument of a nation's policy. You will get a little closer to it, as I said in an article, if instead of the word "national" you will put the word "American." We renounce war as an instrument of national policy, that is to say, war as an instrument of American policy, and then it gets real. Yes, but we still reserve from it, and properly so, the right of defense, not only the right of self-defense, but the right stated by the reservations of the members, including Germany, although the press was wrong in its comment, the right of cooperative defense for the so-called League war is nothing more or less than cooperative action against an aggressor, after an international vote has been taken to find out and reach an agreement as to who is the aggressor. There is, therefore, the right of defense reserved, and the right of cooperative defense, and that covers the whole field of police action.

Even the Monroe Doctrine as laid down in the Senate reservation also, as you know, by some strange happy fortune, was defined as it originally stood, as it has been defined by the greatest of our statesmen in foreign affairs, Mr. Elihu Root, and it refers to a doctrine of American defense. I cannot go into the detail of it here, but we have a contract which excepts from its renunciation the whole field of defense. But under that field, and here is where the cynic begins to feel happy, under that field all American wars have been fought. Therefore you have apparently a renunciation of all but all American wars. No, it does not work out that way, because there is Article 2 as well as Article 1, and Article 2 provides a legitimate way for proceeding, and that legitimate way has certain visible definite tests. Pacific means of settlement. What are they? The Kellogg Pact is implemented by the concurring international legislation of other authorities, and that is arbitration for those things that are arbitrable; the Court for those things designated to go before the Court under the Protocol or statute of the Court, both of them juristic and leading to a judgment or decree at the end, and therefore not ordinarily the subject of war.

Then the real political issues are to be taken over by conciliation and international conference. The Bryan treaties are now brought into that general structure of the international relations of the United States which fits them, so that arbitration and the other procedures, that is the conciliation of the Bryan treaties, and the conference method of the Four-Power Pact of the Pacific, have become almost a code of pacific means of settlement that is the alternative for war.

So that these vague phrases, which at first seemed as though it did not bind us to specific acts, interpreted in terms of equally binding contracts, which have been refurbished and given their commissioners, for the Bryan treaties that have fallen by the wayside and are now once more with their commissions filled up and active, these other treaties added to the Kellogg Treaty, give us a test of legitimate defense, for that power is certainly acting in terms of legitimate defense which stand out against a violator of those pacific means of settlement which are thus designated as the pertinent implementing of the Kellogg Pact.

Gentlemen, we have done much more in this country than the popular imagination has conceived. We are on the path of building up alongside of the ancient means of national security something that may stand us in good stead in the hour of trial. But the trouble is that all of the implements that we have so far been working on are essentially -- I would like your attention on this point because it is very vital -- they are essentially crisis implements; arbitration and the Court for matters of international dispute, and conciliation and conference when that dispute has reached the hot atmosphere of international or national motion and the war spirit is on. All of these conceived in terms of crisis. We have not yet in this country coordinated, in the quiet up-building of habits in time of peace, of these very instruments of international agreement which we hope to use in the hour of crisis, and that is the danger that confronts the American people, because unless the people, like an individual, become habituated to a certain line of action, when the hour of crises comes you will fall back on the rude instruments of barbaric force. It will be

the only safe way, and if a country has not schooled itself in times of quiet judgment in these instruments which it must or should use, in the hour of crises it will use war.

So it seems to me that we are faced with the need of further adjustment, not only of realizing imaginatively what we have done, and we have not yet imaginatively realized that as a nation, but we are faced with the further task of orienting ourselves to those great instruments of continued pacific effort which, in the words of Mr. Root himself, are the greatest experiments in peace that civilization has ever made, the World Court and the League of Nations. They are the only instruments in the world today which are continuing in time of peace to avert crises which cannot be foreseen.

Now what has this to do with the problem before us in Washington at the present time? The problem of peace is very largely a problem of international suspicion, and international suspicion depends upon the absence of means of settlement, and so long as that exists there must be relative preparation for the other means of settlement and hence I, as an American citizen, should say that in proportion as we are not prepared in terms of peace we should be prepared in terms of war. It is a paradox that some of my peace friends will not agree with, who think that preparation in terms of war brings with it the habituation of mind towards settling things that way. The problem of security is the bed rock on which this whole question lies. We need to maintain American security. We need to do it, however, in terms of both the ancient means of security, historic means, and all honor to the men who are in control and responsibility for the

maintenance of that means. But we need to do it by coordinating that means with the high up-building of the other. Security must rest ultimately in terms of peace, and this nation is now at the turning point, at the decisive turning point. I do not mean the turning point of a single year, and still more of a single night, but that great turning point in the nation's history which comes in a generation, when we must swing more and more toward reliance upon the instruments of international justice, and at the same time not lose our own steadying purpose of our historic past, maintain the heritage of American ideals and American freedom, so that the world will know that with our emphasis on justice and fair-play, we are still determined that these forces shall find their reality.

I am not, therefore, going to argue against the Cruiser Bill, futile task in any case. I am going only to ask that the argument of the Navy in seeking to assure the security for which it is responsible, shall take into account the commitment which we have already made in the Kellogg Pact. Unfortunately, as is so often the case, a dispute, an argument between the peace forces and the so-called forces that have been for the Navy might easily have been resolved if we would only look more deeply into the whole situation. The Navy gives out a statement on the 12<sup>th</sup> of November last which, to the leaders of peace movement in this country, seemed to be -- it was not meant to be -- but it was interpreted as a denial of the Kellogg Pact. I say I am sure my friends will verify that. But it read with sentences like this: "The policy of the Navy is based and is designed to support national policies and national interests" --of course support meaning protect, but they go on to say --"to support in every possible way American points established in

the expansion and development of American foreign commerce and American Merchant Marine.”

That can be interpreted, and I am sure of course was meant, simply to state a legitimate and definite need for which we hold the Navy responsible. But the words have the tang of the sea, perhaps. They go stronger than the peace forces like to see them, and at a time when the nation was saying, “We are not any more to use war as an instrument of policy,” it looked as if the Navy was say, “That is just exactly what we are going to use the Navy for.”

These are disputes that sometimes rest on words. Sometimes they go more deeply, but I think that we should, every one of us, be ready to admit that consistency of national policy is the greatest of assets, and that having made a commitment so great as this, after we have been challenged by the world for our lack of consistency in the past, it behooves us to be very careful that there should be no such bewilderment as exists in foreign nations concerning this strange policy, this apparent paradox of a Kellogg Pact on the one hand and a Cruiser Bill on the other. But we should explain the consistent purpose of American policy in a world of realities, to step forward on the path of peace, not losing our way in the dim and treacherous ideals of an unreal world. But, nevertheless, bound to fulfill the promise we have made to the world, and I, for one should like to see the clarity in this dual situation explained. I do not like to see the United States standing misunderstood before the world any more than the Navy does. It can be explained. There is no inherent difficulty in the explanation if one thinks in terms of history; and one who

envisages the problems of peace as France has envisaged it, maintaining its armaments against the menace of oppressing danger, as it conceives the world, and nevertheless binding itself as no other nation has done so far, or at least as few have done, to accept the obligatory clauses of the World Court and, above all, to build its policies upon the League of Nations.

I said at the start that there are two ways of achieving security. One is to emphasize the old historic way of the Army and Navy, and the other is to up-build the forces of peace. That means, sooner or late, articulation with the League of Nations. There is no escape. But the League of Nations has two aspects. One is the aspect of conference when the great statesmen get together, especially in a Council of the League, or their representatives of minor powers in the Assembly; conference on the one hand; and then, if a nation breaks loose and runs amuck in the world, police action against that lawbreaker.

The United States has said repeatedly it will not bind itself to take part in policy action. But that does not mean that we will hold forever from cooperation in the conference method which is the alternative of armament, for if we refuse that method, and refuse it either with individual nations or with the League as a whole, we shall be causing not only our own policy but the policy of other nations to react toward armaments more and more, and the question of armaments is not merely the size of a cannon, eight inch or six inch gun, nor the number of cruisers that a nation possesses. It is the whole mobilizable force of industrial nations today. It is a race with science, which can pull down out of the air for nitrate of ammonia for fertilizer the nitrate that goes into

the high explosives, and with commercial aeroplanes bringing these processes over the civilized world, and don't let anyone imagine that that process is likely to be lessened in the increasing crises of a world with overlapping interests, such as our modern business is creating. For, finally, there is this to be kept in mind, that the world that went into the world War is gone forever, with the relatively isolated communities with the boundaries that were frontiers on the map; that we have ourselves put abroad in private investment, outside of the frontiers of this country, the equivalent of the entire wealth of some six or seven States of the Rocky Mountain area, in private investments. Those investments must be conceived in terms of insurance for the continuing of the arts and sciences of peace. For the world of credit is essentially a world of peace, building upon calculable future, and not upon the incalculable direction of that great conflagration which modern war has become, and it is because of that that the Kellogg Pact is sound. It is because of that that the realistic Foreign Minister of France, eight time Prime Minister, of a country that is not accustomed to regulate its affairs by dim dreams of an unknown future, it is because of that that M. Briand on the tenth anniversary of the Americans entry into the World War, gave us the offer and the challenge, speaking in the name of one who had been Prime Minister of France during the Battle of Verdun, gathering up as he did in that offer to us the spirit that he invoked, on the 27<sup>th</sup> of August last, from those silent fields of France. The dead of the World War speak in the Kellogg pact along with the idealism of the living, and those young cynics who claim that the war to end war was a betrayal of mankind, may well find it is coming back in unknown ways from the silence of those who became the sacrifice for us; that the great

ideal works over into reality, in terms that is at once business and politics and the realizing of all American history. (Applause)

PRESIDENT MILLER: We are greatly indebted to Professor Shotwell for his illuminating and eloquent address. I am impressed with the thought that very many of our differences and disputes are due to differences in the terms in which we think, thus leading to a misunderstanding of each other's point of view. Professor Shotwell referred to the Navy. You are to be privileged to hear as the last speaker the viewpoint of the Navy, or, at least, a distinguished representative of the Navy. It is to be regretted that you have not the privilege of hearing, as was expected, from a member of the United States Senate in which this great subject is now being debated. But that omission, I am sure, you will conclude presently has been fully compensated for, for you are now to have the privilege of hearing from a gentleman who knows perhaps as well as anyone else the American viewpoint and the English viewpoint as well. Formerly a member of the English House of parliament; for many years the editor of the London Daily News; at present a special contributor to the New York Times, to many reviews, and a distinguished author; you will recognize his name when you hear it, if you may not have been privileged to meet him. I expect he will address you from the enlightened liberal English viewpoint, and I now take exceeding pleasure in introducing to you Mr. Philip W. Wilson, (Applause)

Third Speaker

Mr. Philip W. Wilson

Governor Miller, ladies and gentlemen; I am speaking this evening on very short notice, and as a very inadequate pinch-hitter, I believe is the accurate phrase (Laughter) and yet with a certain, indeed a deep, sense of personal responsibility.

I take it that the problem that I am asked to deal with, stated in the simplest terms, is this: How are we to reconcile the command of the sea with the freedom of the sea? It is an age-long problem. It goes right back to the period of legend. What was the “Golden Fleece” which Jason sought? It was the trade of the Black Sea. What was really the private life of Helen of Troy” (Laughter) it was the control of the Dardanelles. The Battle of Salamis kept the Persians out of Europe; the mastery of the Mediterranean threw the might of Rome against the might of Carthage. In the Christian era the decisive battle of Lepanto, of which I know that Professor Shotwell could give you the date (Laughter), that kept the Turks out of Europe, and then Christopher Columbus discovered America, and I sometimes think that if he were living today he would have to discover it over again. (Laughter)

The idea of the command of the sea spread from the little lagoon, known as the Mediterranean, throughout the world, and the Papal authority, as you know, drew a line north and south across the Atlantic and said, “All to the West of that line should be Spanish and to the East Portuguese,”

and it was that which England challenged at the Battle of the Armada, and as a result of that challenge there was established a civilization in North America, and you won't mind my saying that the British Navy has always been proud of the increasing splendor and wealth of the United States, in which it takes a patriarchal interest. (Laughter and Applause)

There came the period of British predominance, over France, over Spain, over Holland and finally over Germany, and it was said that Britain rules the waves, which was more or less true except, I suppose, in the Irish Channel. (Laughter)

I don't think it will be denied that during the Nineteenth Century more than once the British Navy stood as a shield between the United States and European interferences. But today that position is over. There are now three greater Navies which hold the main command of the sea; the United States, diplomatically and navally, dominates American waters. Japan, the Far East, and I am told that Great Britain still exercises some influence in regions not appropriated by her friends. (Laughter and Applause)

The Monroe Doctrine is not only fortified but it is multiplied, and it is the relation between these three Navies which is today in question. What is the actual situation on the high seas? They do not belong to any sovereignty. Judged by population the commercial marine of Norway is greater than that of England. If I may speak frankly as an Englishman, and possible you may have

suspected me of the (Laughter), neither you nor we have a right to regard the ocean as our own.

(Applause) the high seas are the highways for all mankind, and the naval powers ought not to be

Rivals, but ought to be associates trustees for the safety of the seas for everybody. (Applause)

I have had the great privilege of reading the proofs of a book which will almost immediately appear. I believe the author is here present, Mr. Hugh Gordon Miller, and it was from him that I learned how the whole problem should be dealt with as a matter of trusteeship, and not as a matter merely of power or of position.

So long as the world is at peace, the problem of the ocean is solved. There is not only freedom on the seas, there is chivalry on the seas, and there is equity on the seas. There is the lighthouse and the life boat. There is the radio and there is the rescue. Piracy has been put down. The over-seas slave trade has been put down, and I say there is equity. There is not a harbor in the world, I suppose -- at any rate there would be very few; where you do not have equal tolls for all shipping, equal tolls in the Suez Canal; equal tolls in the Panama Canal. Long may that wise rule be continued by all the nations concerned. (Applause)

The sole problem is, therefore, what is to happen if there be war. The British mind is deeply seeped in the past. We broadly walk into the future backwards. (Laughter) Britain has been not only invaded, but successfully invaded, by the Romans. She has never forgotten it; (Laughter) by

the Saxons; by the Danes; by the Normans. I wonder whether you realize that in the House of Lords, a place I escaped (laughter), they still date their meetings in old Norman French, and that every act of Parliament receives the Royal assent in French. It means, of course, that the nation as a whole seldom understands the law. (Laughter)

Even in the case of the Armada invasion was intended. It is a little over one hundred years since our friends, the French, not for the first time, intended to visit us. Now that has created what I might call the Maritime mind in England, and there is no foot of English soil, and still less of Scottish soil, which is more than seventy miles from the sea.

Now today the problem is not invasion but starvation, and I must confess that there seems to me to be in England a misunderstanding of the American position on this. I do not interpret your position as being that you want to starve England in time of war. I rather think that you want to supply her with food. (Laughter) What you object to is England's starving other people, and that is the right of blockade. I want to point out to you this fact. Every word that Dr. Nansen said as to the destructiveness of war applies to the seas as well as to land. I think I am right in saying that at no time did the Germans have more than twenty-five small submarines in commission. The Admiral will correct me possible if I am wrong. And yet there was something like six or eight million tons of shipping destroyed. It is futile for the British to say, "We must protect our shipping by means of a Navy," and for the Americans to say, "We must protect our shipping by

means of a Navy,” unless Navies are going to be on the same side, because otherwise whatever Navy wins, the shipping will have gone before the issue is decided.

There have been negotiations at Geneva. They failed. Anyone who has seen Mr. Bridgeman play golf will know exactly why. (Laughter) I speak as the Anastasia of the Liberal Party. Then Sir Austin Chamberlin came in. Although he is a distinguished British diplomat he speaks French (Laughter), and with a facility which however creditable to his industry as a boy, has always aroused the misgivings of his less educated countrymen. (Laughter) this address is becoming more and more indiscreet. (Laughter and applause)

I don't think I am wrong in saying that Sir Austin Chamberlin in his heart of hearts would not mind an out and out alliance between Great Britain and France, unilaterally. Professor Shotwell knows what that means. (Laughter) As he also knows, at Locarno, Sir Austin was definitely told by the conservative government-- think of that -- told that the agreement with France must be bilateral; must be the guarantee of the Rhineland, not only of France against Germany, but of German against France, It was in that frame of mind that he approached the French Government, and spoke French. (Laughter)

I want to say frankly that it is a dangerous situation in Europe as long as there are conscript Armies, Armies in which by short service the whole of the nations concerned are transformed into potential soldiers. Already Germany is beginning to say that if she is disarmed that the time

has come for the implications, at any rate, of the covenant of the League of Nations to be carried out. It is certainly a very unfortunate thing that there should have been the idea that the French Government supported the French insistence on conscription, and that by a coincidence, not according to terms, France was to support the British Government in its friendly discussions with the United States over cruisers. (Laughter)

What I want to say is this: You are very well aware that on that issue Viscount Cecil resigned from the Cabinet. You know well that practically the whole press of Great Britain attacked the Government on the issue, and that it is today quite the weakest place in the armor of the present government approaching a general election. However, I would plead with all the force at my command, I would plead for a patient handling of this business. The British mind does not take in things too rapidly. (Laughter) You must also remember that each side is discussing this question with eyes averted. You are not entirely thinking of them.

They are not entirely thinking of you. On both sides there are other eventualities which, rightly or wrongly, are entering into the position. I am not one of those who think that it is clearly the time for Great Britain to make it clear that she will not exercise whatever may be her right of blockade with regard to neutrals, except in agreement with the general consensus of peaceful opinion in the world, which would include the United States. (Applause)

I am coming rapidly to a conclusion. I would point out to you the enormous influence today, financial, political, of the United States. You must not be surprised if proud and ancient countries in Europe, that never really made an accurate study of this country, are watching with curious eyes as to the future destinies of this most important factor in world affairs. The reason why, if I may say so with great respect, I welcome the optimistic words with regard to the Pact of peace, which came I think both from Dr. Nansen and from Professor Shotwell, is this: No because I am an idealist, I was an idealist ten years ago, but I have now come down to what you call brass tacks. (Laughter) It seems to me that we are passing out of the Naval and Military era into the commercial era, the era of interchange of commodities, mutual investments; that other factors are arising which are rendering the Military and Naval factor of less importance in the future of the world. The Pact of Peace is therefore not a mere scrap of paper. It is the symbol of an epoch. It is not the destruction of the material, but the consecration of the material to different things; not the obliteration of iron and steel, but the change of the sword into the ploughshare, and the spear into the pruning hook; the chemistry that saves instead of the chemistry that slays.

It seems to me that the hidden rocks of darkness and death on which the Ship of State has so often foundered are being submerged beneath the resurgent tides of a more abundant life.

(Applause)

PRESIDENT MILLER: I promised you an enlightened viewpoint. I put it to you that Mr.

Wilson has redeemed my promise manifold. (Applause) I am sure we will all agree with him on

his proposition of trusteeship in place of rivalry, and let me say to him that we were delighted with his indiscretions, (Laughter & Applause) especially indiscretions expressly so cogently and with such pungency.

The last speaker is a very distinguished representative of our Navy. It will hardly seem credible to you, but he has actually rendered forty-three years of distinguished service in our Navy, and as a result of that distinguished service he has become a great national and international figure. I don't know whether he will speak; undertake to present the views of the Navy. But whatever views he may see fit to express I am sure will be deeply interesting to you. I now have the distinguished honor of presenting to you Rear Admiral Thomas P. Magruder. (Applause)

Fourth Speaker

Rear Admiral Thomas P. Magruder

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen; I hope you will take the remarks of the distinguished president cum grano salis. When I was invited to address you this evening my first impulse was to decline, that for personal limitations. For forth odd years we have been taught to keep our eyes and our ears open and our mouths shut. It is hard to break up the habit of a lifetime. It was such an honor, however, and then when I saw the subject for discussion I was impelled to accept, and I hope in what I have to say that you will realize that no naval officer can be an orator like the gentlemen who have preceded me.

I welcome this subject because I am a pacifist at heart; by profession a militarist; quite an anomalous character. You are told that perhaps I can give you the viewpoint of the Navy. May I give one word personally, and that is I do not represent the Navy nor the Navy Department, but I speak to you as an individual, a Naval officer of long service whose ideas as to the Navy have become somewhat crystallized. (Laughter)

Having been through two wars and in France during the last war, and for two years after the last war, I know something of the horrors of war. The horrors of war and the casualties of war came very near me personally. Out of five brothers in the war, there were two of us in the regular Navy, and we are still in the regular Navy. One was killed by shrapnel from a submarine; one died of disease, and the third one became in France a hopeless invalid and is yet. So I appreciate very deeply the horrors of war, and if there is any word that I may speak that will help to do away with any possibility of war I am more than glad to speak that word.

Three thousand years ago Abner explained “Shall the sword devour to the end?” Ten years ago it looked as though the sword would continue to devour mankind. But all thinking men all men of good will, must now devote their attention to the questions of peace. A superficial observer of world affairs today can only be struck by the fact that all statesmen, all publicists, all educated men, all great men, all men of right feeling, are talking about peace. They are speaking for peace and they are doing their utmost to have peace on earth. As an American I am particularly proud

of the fact that the great apostle of peace, the one whose ideas and principles have been discussed during the past ten years were those of our own President Wilson. (Applause)

The League of Nations and the Treaty of Locarno, the Washington Conference, the Pact of Paris, the Treaties of Conciliation and Arbitration recently signed in Washington, are but evidences of the ideals of President Wilson, and they are to my mind an enduring monument to his genius.

There are other great Americans, and I may say the greatest Americans, whose names are inseparably connected with this struggle for peace. Besides President Wilson, your Governor Hughes of New York, you Hon. Elihu Root, Senator Underwood, Senator Borah, Senator Walsh and other great men in our country are fighting for peace. They are working for peace, and by peace I do not mean peace for us. I do not mean selfish interests, but for the peace of the world and in the interests of all nations.

Nations, however, are ruled by men, and men have certain elemental impulses and instincts among which are the emotions of fear, of greed, and suspicion and hate. They are the atavistic attributes from which we cannot escape except by and through education, and to educate the mass is almost an insurmountable task. There is no good reason, however, why the statesmen and leaders of the countries should not overcome their attributes that came down to them from the Stone Age.

Before discussing the question of the relation of the Navy to world peace I would like to ask you to listen a few moments to what I think are the causes of war. Boiled down into two words, I think that fear and rivalry will cover the possible causes of war. For that reason, if the question of fear is one that is likely to cause war, then the answer to that is to give the nations that fear a sense of security such that they no longer fear. Simple, as expressed in a few words, yet something that is most difficult to attain.

You have heard the part that the great French statesmen for the French Nation have taken in the past ten years in the interests of peace. But you will notice also that great French statesmen, in their Sunday addresses, when dedicating monuments to their war dead, are almost invariably of a truculent nature. The present French Prime Minister is certainly one of the most courageous and indomitable characters in the world today, and while the French through one of their great statesmen are striving for peace, another is assuring security for the French Nation by Armies and conscription, and if necessary, unfortunately, by alliance.

Self preservation and self interests are inherent to nations. We were told that by no less authority than our first president in a message to Congress where he said it is a maxim which has come to us down the ages that one may not trust another nation beyond their self interests. That was George Washington.

I seem to have misplaced my manuscript. However, I have quite a retentive memory and I have been struggling over this speech over four weeks, burning midnight electricity, and I can remember very much of what I was going to say, but much that I was going to say was said by Dr. Nansen and the gentlemen that preceded me. So that I will stick to my ships and I will go back and discuss the Navy, where I am safe and secure. What I have to say about the Navy I must impress upon you is as a personal individual, a naval officer and taxpayer, in a small way.

One reason why I believe we need a Navy is as explained so eloquently by the English gentleman, and which is taught, I think, by history. “Britannia rules the waves” came by way of the Armada and of Trafalgar and finally the battle of Jutland. Now what we want is for Britannia to waive the rules, and come to our way of thinking. (Laughter)

Of course you know very well what took place at the Geneva Conference. That Blue Book is quite illuminating. Our British cousins were agreed to give us parity, but that meant that we had to build something like sixty-two cruisers to get parity. That is one way of getting parity, building upwards. Our position was very clearly expressed, and we wanted parity by our friends coming down to us, which they did not do. And the reasons for it were explained at the time to Parliament by the responsible ministers, and in the speeches that they made immediately afterwards it was quite evident that part of the British Nation was still holding to their traditions which started from the time they were first invaded by the Romans. However, I am one that believes that frequently ministers do not represent the public opinion of a great nation. In our

own case a year ago it was proposed that we build seventy-one ships to cost perhaps a billion dollars or more. Just a year ago here in New York I addressed a meeting of seventeen hundred, the Real Estate Board dinner, I think it was, and I put in my little oar to say that I thought that that was quite excessive, and I gave as one reason that such a program would naturally cause other Naval powers to raise their eyebrows inquiringly, and then perhaps would start them to build with us. In other words, it looked to me like it was a gesture towards the initiation of an insensate competition in armaments.

It may surprise you to know that I as a Naval officer made the remark six years ago that while the Conference at Washington was a success it could have been a greater success if instead of allowing eighteen battleships to the United States and England and ten to Japan, the same logic and the same arguments, it seems to me, should have reduced them to ten for Great Britain and the United States and six for Japan. I said that amongst a group of naval officers and I was on the defensive for quite a while. I am very glad to see here that the question of the freedom of the seas is being discussed not only in the press, but in magazine articles, and being debated now on the floor of the Senate in connection with the Cruiser Bill. That is the one thing that makes the naval officers stop and consider when one comes to the question of naval disarmament. We cannot forget, for instance, that at the beginning of the World War in 1914 and American ship carrying a cargo owned by Americans, and bound for a neutral port, and consigned to a neutral, was not permitted to complete the voyage but was taken by a British cruiser into Kirkwall. That was done

in view of the fact that Great Britain was in a life and death struggle, and in such contingencies questions of treaties and niceties of international law are of no avail.

Speaking of international law, I have struggled for thirty years to find out what international law is, and I have not yet discovered any law in any text book whatsoever on the subject. It is merely a moral questions, a moral agreement to certain acts and precedents that have a moral force, and only a moral force. As I take it a law is something that must be enacted by some law making body, and with sanctions -- that is the new word diplomats have got out so as to avoid the use of the word force -- with sanctions so that nations may expect what they can do in time of war, be they belligerents or be they neutrals.

We very cordially carried on a very liberal neutrality with Great Britain the first two years of the war and that was, particularly I think after Lusitania affair, due to our sympathy being with the Allies. The rape of Belgium, and the sinking of the Lusitania, were two things that turned our people from being strictly neutrals to very liberal neutrals towards the Allies. There is going to be as a cause for war, if unhappily war there should be again, rivalry, and rivalry either for commerce, or the struggle for raw materials, like oil and rubber. But above all I think if there is another war it will be from a competition in armaments. So that if that be true, then we certainly, knowing the cause, it is not difficult to think that the statesmen and the enlightened men of the great nations of Europe may find some remedy. We have in the United States a doctrine known as the Monroe Doctrine. We know the origin of that doctrine, and we know what it is textually.

But that doctrine has outgrown its original pronouncements and now covers a multitude of perhaps sins, or perhaps something else. But anyway we always invoke the Monroe Doctrine when we get into a diplomatic difficulty. However, that doctrine is very close to the American people. They don't know what it is, but they are certainly strong for that doctrine. (Laughter)

But in thinking of the question of the navy in relation to world peace, I have thought of a doctrine that perhaps would help to clear the atmosphere of the present doubt and suspicion, a doctrine that would so clearly and unmistakably say that the United States will have a Navy. It will be a Navy such as it thinks it needs to protect commerce, sea-borne commerce, a sea-borne commerce of none billion dollars annually; to protect the capital of its citizens invested in foreign lands, and to protect the investments of our Government in foreign governments. Such being the case, we cannot view war in any other way, and by war I mean wars of other nations, in any other way than with apprehension. It means that our present high standard of living will have to be adjusted immediately. It will mean that our sea ports will be congested with the products of our factories. It means that our mechanics in the factories will become idle, and it will spell distress for the farmer.

So I have often thought, and particularly of recent months, that a clear pronouncement -- I would like to give the name of the man that I would like to have that doctrine named for, but it is hardly becoming of me to mention his name as he will be my future Commander-in-Chief -- but a doctrine that would state that the Navy of the United States is building, first, to defend the just

rights of the United States at home and abroad; to secure our country from any aggressor; no chance of any invader, and, further, that it will be used when war clouds gather as an instrument to force the aggressor to settle the dispute by peaceful methods. (Applause)

In other words, I would put teeth in the Pact of Paris, and I would try to have the Navy of the United States and the Navy of the British Empire together for that very same purpose.

There are certain points to all of these discussions that perhaps I, as a naval officer, might explain. I have seen confusion of thought and misstatements in the press and otherwise in other places, and I was particularly struck with the fact that frequently the question is spoken of as not limiting armaments, but as disarmament. Also, disarmament will not do away with the possibility of war. We know very well that if all the nations of the world disarmed tomorrow and war should break out again, the nations would bring to the war all the industrial appliances and we would find that we would fight at the beginning, perhaps, with stones, but soon our factories and our chemical factories would turn out weapons of warfare. So even disarmament does not do away with war, and to my mind the only way to do away with war is to do it through moral values; through a spiritual force that should dominate all the nations of the world.

That comes very close to being the millennium. But even so it is well worth struggling for, and I do hope that we in the United States will continue our policy of keeping clear of entangling alliances; keeping clear of making any decisions unless and until we are compelled to make a

decision, and let us then decide that our moral force, as well as our material force, will be for the good of our own people and for the people of all the world. (Applause)